
America Foreclosed:
The 500 Trillion Dollar Debt
Bubble Pops
By Peter E.
Chojnowski, Ph.D.
Edward
Jordan is a 78 year old retired postal worker living in California. Living now on a pension, he had
been financially responsible all his life and was a few short years away from
completely paying off the mortgage on his home. This financial responsibility
was demonstrated by his 800 credit rating, which placed him among the 13% best
credit risks in the nation.
Then one
day a financial broker knocked on his door and told him that he was paying too
much for his monthly mortgage. With his credit rating, she could guarantee him
a rate of 1%. Mr.
After the
deal was signed, Jordan found that his interest rate, sold to him as being only
a single percentage point based on his credit history, would quickly escalate
to as high as 9.95%. When he complained to Countrywide, their “loss-mitigation”
unit offered him an interest only alternative,
but…..at a higher rate and…with a steadily
escalating principal. Monthly payments would eventually rise to several
times
Before
considering the way in which the
A)
Are We in
for a “Very Great American Depression”?
On the
morning that I write (June 18, 2008), the research team for The Royal Bank of Scotland
advised clients to brace for a full-fledged crash in global stock and credit
markets over the next 3 months.[3] To
cite the report, “the S&P index of Wall Street equities is likely to fall
by more than 300 points [this would mean a drop of ¼ of the value on the
exchange] to around 1,050 by September as ‘all the chickens come home to roost’
from the excesses of the global boom, with contagion spreading across Europe
and emerging markets. Such a slide on world bourses would amount to one of the
worst bear markets over the last century.” The report continues, “The Fed is in
panic mode. The massive credibility chasms down which the Fed and maybe even
the ECB will plummet when they fail to hike rates in the face of higher inflation
will combine to give us a big sell-off in risky assets.”[4]
If this
warning, coming from financial analysts in a major world bank, were singular,
it would be disturbing, but this warning is echoing Morgan Stanley which is
speaking of a “catastrophic event”[5]
and LEAP/Europe 2020 which is speaking of a “Very Great American Depression.”
In March
2007, Charles Morris, a lawyer and financial writer whose software company
developed programs for building and analyzing the securitized asset pools that
play such a critical role in this current financial crisis, went to Peter Osnos
at Public Affairs and told him that he expected the “mother of all crashes” by
mid-2008. This prediction and the information that was behind that prediction,
led to the publication of Morris’ most recent book, published in the spring of
2008, entitled The Trillion Dollar
Meltdown.[6] This
prediction --- one that Morris acknowledges to be extremely conservative ---
was uncannily confirmed by John Paulson, founder of the hedge fund Paulson
& Co., in an address to the GAIM International Hedge Fund Conference in
Monaco on June 18th, 2008, when he stated that global writedowns and
losses from the credit crisis may reach $1.3 Trillion…We’re only about a third
of the way through the writedowns.”[7]
B)
Rich Man
Poor Man 2008 and the Second Gilded Age
What most
financial analysts agree upon is that it is because of the default of the
American homeowner and consumer that the world faces a global “systemic crisis”
(i.e., a crisis which throws into question the very foundations of the world
order post-WWII). If the
Such is the
The figures
marshaled by Charles Morris in his The
Trillion Dollar Meltdown, indicates
clearly who is getting relatively richer and who is getting relatively poorer.
In a chapter entitled, “Winners and Losers,” Morris delineates what he refers
to a “tidal shift” in American society --- a widening disparity of wealth and
income not seen since the Gilded Age.[11]
This dramatic shift of taxable income towards the wealthiest people has meant
that the top 10% of the population’s share of all taxable income went from 34%
to 46% an increase of about a third from the years 1980 to 2005.[12]
As Morris
emphasizes, it is the changing wealth distribution within the top 10% of Americans which is truly indicative of the
shift of wealth over the past generation. The “unlucky folks” in the 90th
to 95% percentile actually lost a little ground while those in the 95th
to 99th percentile gained only a little. Overall, the income share
in the 90th to 99th percentile was basically flat. Almost
all the top 1/10th share
gains went to the top 1%. Their slice of the American pie went from 9% to 19%.
The top 1% also own 62% of all private business income, 51% of all stocks, and
70% of all bonds, including those in IRAs and 401(k)s.
Even within
the top 1%, the distribution of gains was radically skewed. Nearly 60% of it
went to the top .1% of 1%. Overall, the top .1`% of 1% more than tripled their
shares to about 9%, while the top .01% of 1%, or fewer than 15,000 taxpayers
quadrupled their share of the national income to 3.6%. Among those 15,000 the
average tax return reported $26 million dollars, in 2005, while the total
amount “earned” by the 15,000 was $384 billion. The Second Gilded Age – and the
summer of our discontent – has arrived.
C)
Bretton
Woods, Keynesian Left Liberalism and the Carter Malaise: 1945-1980
If this is
the “end of the Western world as we’ve known it since 1945,” if this involves
“the collapse in all its dimensions (economic, monetary, financial, diplomatic,
intellectual, and strategic) of the central pillars of the 20th
century incarnated by the United States, we have to ask ourselves “How did we
get here?” Why is it that, “The pillar now lies on quick sand --- the global
architecture will then collapse piece by piece”?[13]
In The Trillion Dollar Meltdown, Charles
Morris charts this history of rise and fall, by first identifying the factor
that allowed the
The problem
was that the children of the 50s became the teenagers of the 60s. The stable
and prosperous American society of the 50s had decided to make up for the
low-birth rates of the Depression 30s and World War 40s. The statistics are
clear. 18 to 24 year olds were 4.3% of the population in 1960 and 5.6% of the
population in 1970. On the face of it, this looks like a minor change. It was
not. The total numbers of youth jumped from 7.6 million to 11.4 million and, in
the Liberal ambiance of the time, this was utterly disruptive. Juvenile
delinquency jumped to the top of the social agenda. Struggling to cope, police
forces became more selective about the behaviors that elicited an intervention,
a process which Daniel Patrick Moynihan called “defining deviance down.”[16]
The
explosion of the college-aged population --- and the fact that a higher
proportion of young people were spending 4 years in college --- set the stage
for the campus war protests of the late 60s and early 70s. The “60s” came to an
end in 1971, when the war protests were over because the draft was over. When
Richard Nixon took office in 1969, Lyndon Johnson having decided not to run in
1968 due to the intensity of the war protests, he inherited an economy that was
already careening towards serious trouble. According to Morris, Nixon’s
fixation on winning reelection in 1972 caused him to make a bad economic
situation immeasurably worse.[17]
For
purposes of understanding the great economic debacle of 2008, Nixon’s rescinding
of the US government’s commitment to redeem dollars for gold is by far the most
important decision made during the second week-end in August 1971 when Nixon
helicoptered his entire economic team to Camp David to hold, what was called,
“the most important economic meeting since the New Deal.” Along with taking the
The
flooding of the system with “floating” dollars was a direct contributor to the
OPEC oil price hikes which helped to trigger the Great Inflation of the 70s.
During the 70s, the Keynesian Left Liberalism, brought to
D)
Volker,
Milton Friedman, and Free-Market Folly: the 80s
Paul
Volker, the “candidate of Wall Street,” was appointed by
According
to Morris, it was Volker’s stubborn insistence on keeping interest rates high,
at 19%, which caused inflation to break in 1982. Economic growth, minus
inflation, would soar to 7.2% by the election of 1984. The dollar also soared
in value. The grim demonstration of what
The 80s are
to be known as the decade of economic deregulation. This deregulation was
motivated by the economic theory of Milton Friedman and the Libertarian Chicago
School of Economics. As Morris states on the very first page of his book,
Chicago School Economics morphed from being a method of analysis to becoming a
Theory of Everything. The core concept was that the Free-Market, if allowed to
work without obstruction, will consistently produce optimum outcomes. Having
adopted this ideological orientation, one of Ronald Reagan’s first acts as
president, in 1981, was to complete the deregulation of oil prices. The
deregulation of the financial markets would soon follow.[22]
E)
Milton
Friedman, the CMO and the Inflation of the Housing Bubble
With the
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, Keynesian Left-Liberalism was replaced by
Milton Friedman’s Libertarian “Monetarism” or Right-Liberalism. Officially,
Monetarism is a theory about money. If the supply of money rises faster than
real economic activity, prices will rise. Government policy need concern itself
only with the money stock. According to this theory, if the Fed expanded the
money stock at approximately the rate of economic growth, prices would also
stay roughly constant.[23]
What the Monetarist theorists had, apparently, not factored into the equation,
was the fact that, under these monetary restrictions, “profit-seeking banks
would created new financial techniques to avoid the restrictions.”[24]
This is exactly what happened.
If
Friedman’s Libertarian Laissez-Faire ideology or “Right Liberalism” was
a dominant spirit in the financial and political circles of the 80s, 90s, and
early 21st century, Charles Morris claims that the engine generating the
speculative bubbles of these last few decades was something very prosaic.
According to Morris, the surge in speculative financial investing was initiated
and fed by a 1973 law requiring companies to set aside money to fund their
pension promises to workers. Pension fund assets quickly ballooned to $1
Trillion and pension fund managers clamored for more leeway in the strict
pension fund investing rules. When the regulations were finally eased in 1979,
it was pension fund, foundation, and endowments that were the source of most of
the venture money.[25]
Another
cause for the phenomenal increase in financial speculation is the complicated
mathematically-structured investment instruments that emerged in the 80s and
90s from a problem which emerged in the secondary mortgage market (i.e., the
market in which mortgages are sold to investors by the banks which originate
the loans). The problem for those who were investing in mortgage-backed
securities was that whenever interest rates fall, homeowners rush to refinance,
and if rates are rising, they hold on to their mortgages forever. Unexpected
shifts in maturities can devastate investor returns.[26]
Most of
these problems were solved by the Collateralized
Mortgage Obligation (CMO), invented in 1983 by Larry Fink and a First
Boston team on behalf of Freddie Mac. The origin of the CMO, now threatening to
undermine the current global financial system, was in the New Deal’s attempt to
establish Savings and Loan banks (S&Ls) as the linchpin of its strategy for
broadening opportunities for home ownership. To keep S&Ls in lendable
funds, the government established quasi-federal agencies (e.g., Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac) that would liquefy local lending markets by buying up mortgages
from S&Ls and other qualified lenders. In order to maintain their own
liquidity, these agencies would maintain their own cash flow by selling mortgage-backed securities or “mortgage
pass-throughs.” These securities are created by transferring a group of
mortgages to a trust, which in turn
issues certificates representing a slice of all the principal and interest that
it receives. For example, a trust comprising $100 million in mortgages paying
an average interest rate of 6% would sell a certificate entitling the investor
to, say, 1% of the trust’s proceeds. The investor would therefore receive 1% of
$6 million each year, until all the mortgages are paid down.[27]
With the
aid of mathematics Ph.D.s and high speed computers, Larry Fink and associates
were able to make these mortgage-backed bonds more attractive by “slicing” or
tranching them horizontally into three segments, with different bonds for each
segment. The money that came in from all
the mortgages – no matter on which tranche (i.e., mortgages with borrowers
with excellent credit histories, borrowers of less than excellent credit
histories, and, finally, in the lowest tranche, risky mortgages offered to less
than credit worthy borrowers) would be filtered through the CMO from the top
down. The top-tiered bonds, which represented, say 70% of mortgages, had first
claim on all cash flows. Since it is
inconceivable that 30% of normal mortgages portfolio will default, top-tier
bonds get triple-A, super-safe ratings and paid a lower interest rate, say 4%;
safer and, yet, a smaller yield.
The second
tranche would included, typically, 20% of the mortgages that would be sold at a
somewhat higher percentage rate, say 8%, while the third tranche, covering the
last 10% of the mortgages was the first to absorb all loses --- since there
would be a certain low percentage of mortgages which were defaulted on. Since
these bonds were risky --- you might not get paid if you held them – they would
have a higher interest rate, say 10-12%. This would be equivalent to
speculative or “junk” bond yields; the CMO, therefore, offered risk and yield
choices to satisfy any investor’s appetite.[28]
The first
CMOs were very profitable. All the big Wall Street firms began scarfing up
mortgages and putting them out as CMOs. The CMO fundamentally changed the
entire mortgage business. Formerly, mortgage lenders were a “one-stop shop.”
They interviewed applicants, approved the credits, held the mortgages,
collected the monthly payments, and managed default workouts and foreclosures.
CMO made mortgages the stuff of financial speculators and separated the home
“owner” and borrower from those who “owned” the mortgage.
The new
mortgage industry was like this: mortgage banks with little capital attracted
and screened mortgage applicants. Other thinly capitalized mortgage banks bid
for the loans and held them until they had enough to support a CMO. Investment
banks, using complicated mathematical models, designed and marketed the CMO
bonds. Serving specialists managed collections and defaults. By the 90s, the
complexity of these financial instruments spiraled out of control. CMO “shops”
spewed out phantasmagorical 125-tranche instruments that no one could possibly understand. The stability of these financial
houses of cards depends upon families and individuals keeping up payments and
not defaulting. What if they do in record numbers? Very big, very complex, very
opaque structures built on extremely rickety foundations are a recipe for
collapse.
As was
inevitable, in light of the above, there was decomposition in mortgage banking.
A new generation of mortgage banks, instead of holding them for the term of the
loan, sells off mortgages in weeks or months; as the point of loan origination,
brokers are usually compensated strictly for the fees they generate, and they
often work with a customer entirely by email or phone. Countrywide reports show
that their staff programmatically steers customers towards financial products
with the highest fees.[29]
When money is free because of low rates and fractional reserve banking, when
lending is costless and riskless the typical lender will keep on lending until
there is no one else to lend to. By the 1st decade of the 21st
century, we had entered --- or we were told by Alan Greenspan that we had
entered --- a glorious new era of finance. Greenspan announced “a new paradigm
of active credit management.”[30]
Profit seeking banks would now give home equity loans to strapped homeowners
and high-rate credit cards for insolvent consumers. The brokers would simply
log in the loans, collect his or her fees, and sell them off to yield-hungry
investors. The broker’s fees were real money. The loans might be paid off.[31]
Stephen Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, has called the Fed’s actions
during this period of unlimited credit expansion, “unconscionable.” In 2004,
when we were reaching the height of this credit spike, the Economist magazine stated, “the global financial system…has become
a giant money press as America’s easy money policy has spilled beyond its
borders….This gush of global liquidity has not pushed up inflation, instead, it
has flowed into share prices and houses around the world, inflating a series of
asset-price bubbles.”[32]
In order to
pay for the costs that are associated with buying and paying for a home, many
consumers have, in recent years, resorted to home-equity loans and credit
cards. With the coming of the credit crunch many of those home equity loans
have been reduce or withdrawn. Here it is important to remember that if, say,
your home equity line of credit --- for whatever reason your lender may decide
--- is reduced from say, $20,000 to $10,000 and you just happen to have spent $10,000
dollars of the line already, it will be reported to the credit agencies that
you have “maxed out” your credit account, causing your credit score to suddenly
tumble. Moreover, in light of the drying up of the home equity market, more and
more people are maxing out their credit cards, often using them to make
payments on their mortgages. With interest rates for good credit risks
approaching 20% and interest for the less qualified as high as 40%, it is not
surprising that Fortune magazine has
reported credit card payment delinquencies to be up about 50%.[33]
F)
2008:
It is very
difficult to adequately portray the ocean of debt upon which the
The answer to the above question is clearly, “Yes, it will
hurt and it will threaten to collapse the system.” The financial powers that be
know this. That is why they have tried to put off the day of reckoning by
injecting hundreds of billions of dollars of liquidity into the banking system
and by regularly cutting interest rates in order to keep the lending and
borrowing rolling, in spite of the fact that this just exaggerates the problem.
By “printing money” to provide liquidity, the Federal Reserve has devalued the
dollar to the point that it has fatally undermined the US greenback’s status as
the world’s reserve and trading currency. It has, also, fired up the furnace of
inflation. For how long will the Chinese, Russians, and Arabs hold dollars, US
bonds, and assets that are increasingly worthless? By allowing foreigners to
buy
What is the
outlook for the next couple of years? To quote Charles Morris, who is
intentionally moderate in his conclusions, “Over the next 2 years (2008 and
2009), $350 billion in sub-prime and other risky residentially mortgages will
reset, many at punishing rates. Defaults will rise sharply. A large number of
people, perhaps as many as 2 million could lose their homes [Leap/Europe 2020
estimates 10 million]. House prices will continue to fall. Consensus estimates
at 10% but pessimists are expecting at least 30% and pessimists have yet to be
wrong in this cycle. Many consumers will be stuck with “upside-down” mortgages
(i.e., greater than the market value of their homes)….Consumer spending must fall. The consumer spending which
jumped from 67% of GDP to 72% in early 2007 was due to the withdrawal of $9
Trillion in home equity and is no longer sustainable, especially with rising
oil prices….The stage is set for a true shock and awe surge of asset
write-downs through most of 2008….Add to this even mildly bad outcomes in the
credit insurance markets, and the global
financial system will be in catastrophe.”
To quote,
Morris, during the 1998 potential global financial meltdown due to the Asian
currency crisis and the Russian defaults, Fed officials gathered 20 New York bankers in a
conference room, and they agreed to put up $3.6 billion to resolve the crisis.
In 2008, there is no one to call a meeting, there is no conference room big
enough to hold the parties, and no one knows who should be on the invitation
list.[34]
[1] Charles
R. Morris, The Trillion Dollar Meltdown:
Easy Money, High Rollers, and the Great Credit Crash (
[2] St. Basil the Great, J. 198.26 – 199.2.
[3] Ambrose
Evans-Pritchard, “Royal Bank of
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ambrose Evans-Prichard, “Morgan Stanley warns of ‘catastrophic event’ as ECB fights Federal Reserve” in Telegraph, June 16, 2008.
[6] Morris, pp. xvi-xvii.
[7] Tom Cahill and Poppy Trowbridge, “Paulson & Co. Says Writedowns May Reach $1.3 Trillion,” Bloomberg, June 18, 2008.
[8] Cf. Financial Times, April 2, 2007.
[9] Global Anticipation Bulletin, LEAP/Europe 2020, April 16, 2007.
[10] Cf.
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, Econometrics Laboratory Software Archives,
[11] Morris, p. 139.
[12] Ibid.
[13] “The Current Crisis Explained in One Thousand Words” in Global Anticipation Bulletin, LEAP/Europe 2020, September 16, 2007.
[14] Morris, p. 9.
[15] Citation in Morris, p. 4.
[16] Morris, pp. 6-7.
[17] Ibid., pp. 8-9.
[18] Ibid., pp. 10-14.
[19] Ibid., pp. 14-17.
[20] Ibid., pp. 24-25.
[21] Ibid., pp. 26-27.
[22] Ibid., p. 32.
[23] Ibid., pp. 17-18.
[24] Ibid., p. 25.
[25] Ibid., p. 20.
[26] Ibid., pp. 38-39.
[27] Ibid., pp. 38-39.
[28] Ibid., pp. 39-40.
[29] Ibid., p. 56.
[30] Ibid., p. 61.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid., pp. 62-63.
[33] Ibid., pp. 121.
[34] Ibid., pp. 128-133.
SEE ALSO:
• An Interview
with Dr. Chojnwoski on Economic Meltdown - Oct 11, 2008
• Dr. Chojnowski's September 2008 CFN article: "The Fall of Phantom Assest":
• Conference on "The New World Order and the Economic Collapose"
From July 2008 edition of
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